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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
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TO : Deputy Director (Intelligence)

SUBJECT: Recent Soviet policy against German rearmament

The defeat of EDC by the French Assembly ended the first phase of a sustained Orbit offensive against the strength and solidarity of the Western coalition. This offensive, the central objectives of which are to isolate the United States from its allies and to prevent the rearmament of Western Germany and its integration with the Western alliance system, concentrated on what the Soviet leaders apparently regarded as the most vulnerable points in the Western position. These included: (1) the overwhelming desire in France for an end to the Indochina war; (2) Western European, particularly French, fears of a rearmed and unified Germany; and (3) the fact that the West's defense structure and German policy, particularly as embodied in EDC, were predicated on the indefinite continuation of the division of Germany.

Beginning with Molotov's actions at Berlin and continuing through the Geneva conference up to the present, Soviet policy has been directed at these principal objectives: (1) to delay indefinitely, and if possible defeat, French ratification of EDC; (2) to encourage Franco-German hostility as the most potent source of conflict and division in the Western world; (3) gradually to detach France from the US and Britain; (4) to undermine Adenauer, and discredit his Western-oriented policies; and (5) inside Germany, to bring about a drastic reorientation which would substitute reunification for Western integration as the central objective of the Bonn government.

Recent Soviet diplomatic moves and propaganda statements show that Soviet policy is placing heavy reliance on public pressure in Western Europe in order to force changes, or at least indecision and inaction, in official policies on German rearmament. Moscow's purpose is to furnish ammunition to the European opponents of German rearmament. The method is to drive a wedge between the traditional factions of European Socialist parties and between public opinions and governments and in this way to induce delay and, ultimately, abandonment of plans to rearm West Germany and to incorporate it into the Western defense structure.

State Dept. review completed

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The 9 September press statement of the Soviet Foreign Ministry on European security and German rearmament was intended as a clear restatement of Soviet opposition to any form of West Germany rearmament and is a clear example of the tactic of providing ammunition to French and other European opponents of German rearmament. It contained no new substantive lines or indications of a change in the Soviet position. Its wording makes clear that the USSR intends to continue to rely on the French as the principal means of blocking West German rearmament. It suggests that the USSR does not consider a major concession necessary at this time to head off German rearmament since the statement simply reiterates support for a four-power conference on Germany, Molotov's proposal for European collective security, and a settlement of the armaments problem.

Moscow's approach with respect to France aims to cultivate the Mendes-France government and to win support for Soviet plans for Germany and European security. Its method is to offer enough bait so that the French will be encouraged to continue their search for an alternative to West German rearmament, mainly through further negotiations with the USSR. It now seems clear that the predominant factor in the Communists' decision to conclude an Indochina armistice on terms more favorable than the French had reason to expect was Moscow's reliance on France to serve as the main instrument of its European policy.

Moscow's overtures to France in recent weeks have included: (1) Polish offer of a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance to France on 25 August, just prior to start of Assembly's final debate on EDC. (2) Statement by Soviet ambassador Vinogradov to Mendes-France on 26 August that his government now felt there was a large measure of agreement between the Soviet and French positions on disarmament. This approach was obviously aimed at those French elements who see the prospect of a disarmament agreement as the best excuse for postponing German rearmament and cutting French military expenditures. These approaches probably were responsible for Mendes-France's instructions to his ambassador in Moscow to tell the Soviet government that he hoped that Vinogradov's statement on the possibilities of progress in disarmament talks would be translated into action in the UN subcommittee. Moscow may now seek new ways to encourage the French to believe that four-power negotiations on disarmament would be fruitful.

Recent Soviet moves toward Great Britain have been directed toward strengthening opposition to the government's policy on German rearmament. Moscow apparently regards Labor opinion as the most promising field for exploitation. Pravda's violent

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blast at Mr. Attlee on 9 September represented an attempt to influence the position of the Labor party on German rearmament at the forthcoming Labor party conference and, secondly, to discredit Attlee's leadership and strengthen the Bevan faction in the contest for the control of the party.

The strong criticism of Attlee is in striking contrast with Pravda's favorable reference to Bevan's views on German and Japanese rearmament. Moscow's aim of discrediting the Attlee policy is revealed in the article's opening sentences which claim that the Labor delegations's visit to the USSR and China was undertaken at the insistence of the party rank-and-file who sincerely desire friendly relations with the USSR and China and that the party leadership, meaning Attlee, could not disregard this sentiment.

Pravda also attempted to destroy Attlee's control by identifying him with "reactionary elements in the US and Britain." The Soviet leaders' attitude toward Attlee was also clearly revealed at the dinner given by Malenkov for the Labor group on 10 August. Khrushchev's toast, for example, was addressed directly to Bevan. He made even less attempt than the other Soviet leaders to conceal that they were attempting to split Bevan's wing of the Party from the Attlee wing and to induce the whole party to break with official British policy. A British Embassy official in Moscow told Ambassador Bohlen that Attlee was almost completely ignored on both this and the succeeding evening in Moscow.

Soviet efforts to influence Labor policy were also evident in Shvernik's 7 September invitation on behalf of the Soviet All-Union Council of Trade Unions to the Congress of the British Trade Union Council to send a delegation to the USSR and to resume the activities of the Anglo-Soviet Trade Union Committee. The Soviet press displayed considerable interest in this Trade Union Congress, stating that the vote favoring rearming West Germany passed by such a narrow margin that "it is safe to say that such a resolution may well be defeated" at the coming Labor Party conference. Soviet comment also continues to stress the theme of international trade union unity in the interests of peace, including a move to consolidate the WFTU and the ICFTU.

Another revealing sign of Moscow's close interest in manipulating Labor opinion occurred in the 26 August interview in Paris between Soviet ambassador Vinogradov and Mendes-France. In the course of expressing the USSR's devotion to an international detente, Vinogradov referred to the same Bevan pamphlet mentioned by the Pravda attack on Attlee. He said the Soviet government thought there were a number of worthwhile suggestions in this book.

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While Soviet policy has concentrated on marshalling European sentiment against German rearmament, Moscow has not neglected to remind West Germans of their stake in the issues under discussion. Molotov enunciated the main lines of Soviet policy toward West Germany at Berlin. He hammered repeatedly on the point that the ratification of EDC would permanently seal the partition of Germany, that EDC would convert West Germany into a "semioccupied" country by stationing American, British, and French troops there for decades, that the Bonn and Paris agreements were humiliating to the German people, and that the only hope of unification rested in entering negotiations with the East Germans and repudiating Adenauer's Western-oriented policies.

Following the Berlin conference, Molotov moved quickly to enhance the prestige and ostensible freedom of the East German government. The USSR granted "sovereignty" to this regime on 26 March. This policy of concessions to East Germany was motivated by a Soviet intention to promote East Germany as a partner in international and all-German negotiations, to stimulate French-West German differences, and thus to delay actions on EDC. The East German regime has been permitted to take the initiative in a trade offensive against the West and is attempting to establish official trade delegations in Western countries as a first step toward international recognition.

The USSR appears to be relying increasingly on its campaign for East-West German unity talks as a means of postponing a four-power debate on a peace treaty and free elections, questions on which the Kremlin suffers from an embarrassing lack of maneuverability. In this connection, Moscow may be expected to take full advantage of a reported plan of the West German Social Democrats to create a public attitude favoring direct negotiations with the East German regime and the neutralization of Germany.

Soviet moves to endow the East German regime with increasing trappings of sovereignty, constant reiteration by Soviet and East German leaders of appeals for closer East-West German relations, and such statements as Malenkov's to Grotewohl that the USSR is interested in expanding ties with West Germany all reflect the basic aim of discrediting Adenauer's pro-Western policy and encouraging every tendency inside Germany to challenge him.

The abolition on 6 August of all Soviet occupation legislation on political, economic and cultural matters in East Germany

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is the most dramatic step by the USSR to enhance the prestige and ostensible freedom of the East German government since the granting of sovereignty in March. Recent relaxation of controls on East German travel to West Germany coincides with the policy of encouraging contacts between East and West Germany in the hope that the West German public will support an all-German conference on unification and other problems.

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